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Abstract: The environmental, social, and governance (ESG) rating of firms is a useful tool for
stakeholders and investment decision-makers. This paper develops a rough set model to relate ESG
scores to popular corporate financial performance measures. This methodology permits handling
with information in an uncertain, ambiguous, and imperfect context. A large database was gathered,
including ESG scores, as well as industry sector and financial variables for publicly traded European
companies during the period 2013–2018. We carried out 500 simulations of the rough set model for
different values in the discretization parameter and different grouping scenarios of firms regarding
ESG scores. The results suggest that the variables considered are useful in the prediction of ESG rank
when firms are clustered in three or four equally balanced groups. However, the prediction power
vanishes when a larger number of groups is computed. This would suggest that industry sector and
financial variables serve to find big differences across firms regarding ESG, but the significance of the
model drops when small differences in ESG performance are scrutinized.
Keywords: corporate financial performance; corporate social performance; ESG rating; rough sets
1. Introduction
The practice of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has gained importance over the last few
decades [1–3]. This behavior is the result of the globalization of markets and demands for greater
transparency and commitment of companies to society. Socially responsible investment dates back to
the 19th century, when activism and cooperativism emerged as a means of reconciling business goals
with social and ethical ends [4].
Based on Garriga and Melé [5], the main CSR theories are classified as instrumental theories,
political theories, integrative theories, and ethical theories. According to instrumental theories, CSR is
a strategic tool that allows companies to achieve economic objectives and wealth creation. In this vein,
companies bet on ethical and responsible behavior to the extent that this behavior brings competitive
advantages to the business. Three groups of instrumental theories can be identified, relying on the
economic objective proposed: Maximizing the shareholder value, strategies for achieving competitive
advantage, and cause-related marketing. In the first group, the objective is to maximize shareholder
value via share price [6–8]. The second group focuses on how to allocate resources to achieve long-term
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social goals by creating competitive advantages [9–11]. Finally, the third group proposes that the
objective of CSR is to broaden the effects of marketing [12–14].
Political theories focus on the effects of excessive corporate power on society and the benefits
of responsible corporate power in the political arena. Three approaches of political theories can be
distinguished: Corporate constitutionalism, integrative social contract theory, and corporate citizenship.
Corporate constitutionalism [15] considers that the company is a social institution, which has social
power that must be used responsibly [16]. Integrative social contract theory [17] takes into account
the socio-cultural context and normative and empirical aspects of management in a comprehensive
manner. This theory argues that social responsibility comes from the consent of society [18]. Lastly,
corporate citizenship analyzes the company’s activities so that they can be considered as legitimating
vis-à-vis society [19,20].
In turn, integrative theories study the identification, channeling, and response of companies
to the social demands of stakeholders. Four groups of integrative theories can be identified: Issue
management, the principle of public responsibility, stakeholder management, and corporate social
performance. The first group deals with the processes by which companies identify, evaluate,
and respond to the political and social problems that significantly impact them [21]. The second
group was proposed by Preston and Post [22], and focuses on company policies that are not only
based on law and regulation, but also on a broad pattern of social direction reflected in public opinion,
emerging issues, and implementation practices, amongst others. The third group focuses on the
possible effects that business decisions may have on stakeholders [19,23]. The fourth group integrates
some of the previous theories and also includes research on social legitimacy [24,25].
Finally, ethical theories study the ethical requirements on which the relationship between business
and society is based. As main approaches, it can distinguish the following: Normative stakeholder
theory, universal rights, sustainable development, and the common good approach. The first approach
was proposed by Freeman [26], and points out that intrinsic value is the common interest of all
stakeholders. So, each group of stakeholders should be considered for its own sake and not for its
ability to promote the interest of some other group (e.g., shareowners). The second approach considers
that human rights is the fundamental basis of CSR [27,28], which led to the emergence of other
approaches (e.g., Global Compact). The third approach is aimed at demanding convergence between
the three pillars of economic development, social equity, and environmental protection. The fourth
approach points out that business, being part of society, must contribute to the common good (e.g.,
the creation of wealth, the efficient and fair provision of goods and services, and respect for the
inalienable and fundamental rights of the individual).
Over the past decades, there has been a growing interest among the scientific community in
examining the relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate financial
performance (CFP) [8,29–31]. McWilliams and Siegel [32], for example, point out that there is an
ideal level of CSR that can be determined by managers via cost0-benefit analysis, and that there is a
neutral relationship between CSP and CFP. Luo and Bhattacharya [33] state that in companies with
low innovation capacity, CSR actually reduces the levels of customer satisfaction, which could damage
the market value. Charlo et al. [8] argue that responsible firms exhibit a higher systematic risk and
have greater size. The authors concluded that being responsible does not translate into lower business
results or less stock profitability. Seifert et al. [34] investigated the relationship between corporate
philanthropy and the profitability of Fortune 1000 companies, concluding that there is no significant
effect on profits from corporate generosity. Finally, Brammer et al. [35] state that firms with higher CSP
scores tend to achieve lower returns, while firms with the lowest possible CSP scores outperformed
the market.
From an analysis of the above-mentioned works, it is evident that the results obtained are
inconclusive and even somewhat in conflict. Some authors argue that the main issue is the correct
identification of responsible and irresponsible companies [36–41]. Furthermore, these studies are
characterized by being heterogeneous, which hampers comparison [30]. It may therefore be stated that
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debates regarding the ambiguity of the sign of the relation, the causality of the effect, and moderating
and mediating factors are still unresolved. Significantly, the vast majority of studies have focused on the
influence of CSP on CFP. In fact, relatively few studies have analyzed the inverse relationship between
CFP and CSP, as mentioned by Roberts and Dowling [42] and Julian and Ofori-Dankwa [43]. In these
cases, the characteristics of the companies involved in the CSR activities are analyzed. This paper is
part of this line of research, which includes the works by McGuire et al. [44], Garcia-Castro et al. [45],
Dupire and M’Zali [46], and Lin et al. [47], among others.
It is important to note that CSR is not a variable, and, therefore, it is not measurable [48–50].
Based on the foregoing, the CSR literature has used the term CSP, which is a way of making CSR
applicable and putting it into practice [51,52]. However, in agreement with Chen and Delmas [53],
CSP measurement addresses a broad spectrum that makes it difficult to generate a proxy that can reflect
its full scope. Although CFP measurement addresses performance indicators that are clearly defined
and readily available (e.g., return on assets, return on equity, etc.), CSP indicators are not. Due to
the qualitative nature of CSP, the assessment of CSP is based mostly on “soft” indicators related to
management practices (e.g., philanthropic programs, customer relations, etc.) rather than on “harder”
indicators (e.g., toxic releases, tons of CO2 emissions, etc.).
Because of the complexity of CSP measurement, a number of specialized firms, the so-called
ESG (environmental, social, and governance) rating agencies, have emerged in the last two decades.
These firms provide ESG information and tools for measuring the contribution of companies to
sustainable value creation [54]. ESG rating agencies assess and rate the environmental, social,
and governance-related business practices of firms throughout the world [2,55,56]. In this vein,
these agencies use information collected from each of the companies through questionnaires and
analysis of public information (e.g., CSR reports, annual reports, news, etc.), which is examined
by interdisciplinary work teams in different geographical areas [57]. Some of the most important
ESG rating scores include the Thomson Reuters ESG Score, the Bloomberg ESG Disclosure Score,
the Vigeo-Eiris ESG Score, and the MSCI ESG Score. Based on the literature review and to the best
of our insight, only a few studies have analyzed the relationship between ESG rating agencies and
CFP [58,59]. Nonetheless, the empirical results of these studies are inconclusive. Considering the
above introduced consideration, this paper intends to contribute to the extensive literature in this field
by employing the Thomson Reuters ESG Score in order to measure the level of CSP. To our knowledge,
this approach is one of the first that uses the Thomson Reuters ESG score in academic research about
the impact of the ESG rating on CFP.
Regarding the CFP measurement, the academic literature has identified two main options:
Accounting-based measures and market-based measures. The first includes ratios such as return
on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS), etc.; the latter includes Tobin’s Q,
share prices, beta, etc. A comparative analysis of the literature using market measures with those
using accounting measures shows that authors, such as Martínez-Ferrero and Frías-Aceituno [60] and
Grewatsch and Kleindienst [61], claim that market measures are more adequate for assessment of
future and long-term performance. Hillman and Keim [9] point out that market measures capture
shareholder value creation without being subject to accounting measure shortfalls. On the other hand,
López et al. [62] assert that a firm’s behavior can be explained using market indicators, but accounting
data are less noisy because they indicates what is actually happening in the company. Moreover,
as argued by McGuire et al. [44], accounting measures, especially the return on assets, are better
predictors of CSR than market measures, although they also claim that accounting measures are
subject to bias from managerial manipulation. Accordingly, since each of the arguments is regarded as
adequate as the best way to measure CFP, this study will use both accounting and market variables to
gauge financial performance of companies.
The question that arises is whether “doing good by doing well” is possible [63]; in other words,
whether or not a committed behavior of companies in CSR terms can lead to good financial results,
or, on the contrary, those firms aligned with CSR principles necessarily assume a cost in terms of
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profitability. Researchers have proposed different mechanisms for analyzing the relationship between
CSR and firm performance. The slack resources mechanism proposes that companies engage in
CSR because they are doing well financially and have slack resources [47,64–66]. The risk reduction
mechanism suggests that CSR may decrease the risk of firms, making it easier and cheaper to obtain
financial resources in the markets [67–70]. So, highly leveraged companies have an incentive to
engage in CSR activities and improve their CSP. Brammer and Millington [71] argue that a high level
of leverage negatively affects the reputation of the company in the financial markets, so they have to
perform CSR practices to improve it as a signal of financial strength to market participants. Moreover,
high CSP attracts socially responsible investors [72,73], which can have an impact on the cost of capital.
Oikonomou et al. [74] find that credit rating agencies take into account the risk-mitigating effects of
CSR activities, and award better ratings to firms with better CSR scores. Sahut et al. [75] find that firms’
leverage allows them to obtain more financial resources and positively affects their CSR practices.
However, this result contrasts the findings of Zwiebel [76], who shows that excessive company debt
increases interest expenses, which discourages investment in CSR, as this result is in line with the slack
resources hypothesis. The penance mechanism assumes that companies engage in CSR as a form of
penance to offset past corporate social irresponsibility and improve the image of the company [77].
Finally, the insurance mechanism states that a good CSR image provides an insurance against future
corporate social irresponsibility [78]. Godfrey et al. [79] conclude that CSR activities lead to positive
attributions from stakeholders, who then temper their negative judgments and sanctions toward firms
because of this goodwill. According to several authors [80,81], companies with high CSP have loyal
stakeholders during economic crises. Moreover, Koh et al. [82] expect firms with high CSP to reduce
their litigation risk.
Thus, due to their characteristics, some companies can be more likely to engage in CSR activities
and have better corporate sustainability performance. According to these theories, companies with
slack resources, those that have committed irresponsible actions (penance mechanism), and those
that may be involved in socially irresponsible actions in the future (insurance mechanism) have a
greater incentive to engage in CSR activities. Consequently, they should have a better score in the ESG
evaluations carried out by social rating agencies.
On the other hand, it is important to emphasize that the measurement of socially responsible
behavior is carried out by social rating agencies. ESG scores reported by those agencies are
supposed to be an accurate proxy for corporate social performance. Social rating agencies collect
firms’ public information, as well as information directly from the assessed companies, to calculate
ESG scores. As proposed by Drempetic et al. [83], it is possible that larger firms often use more
resources for providing ESG data for the rating agencies, and may therefore obtain better ESG scores.
This would imply the existence of a bias in favor of bigger companies, because ESG scores can
be influenced by resources for providing ESG data. In this line, Adams et al. [84], Neu et al. [85],
Brammer and Pavelin [86], and Haniffa and Cooke [87] find that the extent of corporate social
disclosure is positively related to the size of the company. In addition, Surroca et al. [88] and
Lin et al. [47] state that size is one important variable influencing CSP.
Unlike previous works in which the impact of CSR on business performance is analyzed, the aim
of this paper is to empirically analyze whether the characteristics of companies have an impact on their
ESG rating. In other words, we analyze whether companies’ behavior in terms of CSR can be explained
by their financial characteristics. Thus, profitability is expected to have a positive impact on the ESG
score due to the slack resource mechanism: Those companies with the greatest resources are precisely
those who can afford the necessary investments to improve the ESG score. Regarding leverage,
the companies that use the financial markets the most are expected to have incentives to improve their
ESG score, thus reducing the financing cost. The size of companies can also influence due to a firm
size bias. The business sector can cause companies to engage more in CSR activities as a means to
improve their image, and avoid fines, penalties, and boycotts by consumers, which would harm future
business profits.
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In order to deal with a situation where vague and uncertain behavior in data is present, we propose
the use of rough sets, a powerful mathematical tool that allows the extraction of information from this
context, which is not possible utilizing traditional set theory [89,90].
Our results suggest that ESG scores can be partially predicted by using financial and stock market
information, regardless of the discretization parameter used in the rough set model. This gives insights
into the relevance of such variables in the environmental, social, and governance performance of firms,
which can be used by stakeholders in their investment-decision-making processes.
The paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 introduces the basics of rough set theory
and the dataset used in the research. Section 3 discusses the results obtained when applying the
methodology to the data from Section 2, and our main conclusions are given in Section 4.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Rough Sets
Rough set theory was developed by Pawlak [89]. This methodology is used to define the relation
between variables in a context with uncertainty, ambiguity, and imperfect data. Rough sets can
be used for pattern recognition and feature selection. They are used in several disciplines, such as
finance [90,91], banking [92], engineering [93], medicine [94], etc. The data and their knowledge are
associated, but variables with the same information are very indiscernible or similar.
We can define an information system (U, A) by a finite set of objects U and finite set of attributes
A. A decision system T is constructed with the information data, and a decision variable based on an
attribute not considered in A is added:
T = (U, A ∪ {d})where d /∈ A. (1)
The elements of A represent conditional attributes that relate any object or variable with one
decision attribute. A set of attributes configures a subset B of A (B ⊆ A) like a binary relation, called an
indiscernibility relation IND(B), on U. This relation is defined when two objects Xi and Xj are equal
for every attribute element by the set of attributes of B. In this case, both objects are indiscernible.




, b ∈ B (2)
An information system T = (U, A) with a set of attributes B ⊆ A; given any object X ⊆ U, we can
use the information inside B to approximate to X. Two operations are defined, the B-lower (B∗) and








{B(X) : B(X) ∩ X 6= 0}. (4)
The B-lower approximation of a set depends on all of the different blocks or partitions of U/B
that represent the equivalence classes of indiscernibility relations included in this set of attributes.
The B-upper approximation represents the union of all indiscernibility relations that have non-empty
intersections with the set of attributes.
Figure 1 represents the upper and lower approximations of X. The area in the black box is the
domain U, while the area in the blue curve denotes X, and the orange and green areas denote the
B-upper and B-lower approximations of X, respectively.
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Figure 1. Scheme of the U domain, X set, and B-upper and B-lower approximations of X.
We can define a B-boundary region of X as the difference between the B-upper and
B-lower approximations:
BNb(X) = B∗(X)− B∗(X). (5)
The B-boundary region represents if the X object is exact or inexact with respect to the set of
attributes of B. Then, if the B-boundary region is BNb(X) = ∅, the X value is an exact value with
respect to a set of B, and when the B-boundary region is BNb(X) 6= ∅, X is an inexact or rough object
with respect to B.
A B-reduct of X, RED(B), is the minimal subset of attributes that provides the same quality of
approximation as the whole set of attributes. This way, attributes not in the reduct can be removed
without losing relevant information. The B-core of X, CORE(B), is the intersection of all reducts, i.e.,
a set with the most significant attributes.
Once reduct computation is performed, the decision rules can eventually be generated by
determining the decision attribute value based on the condition attribute values. This process
follows the popular IF–THEN form. Each decision is properly assessed based on support, accuracy,
and coverage concepts. Accuracy measurement is computed by dividing the support of the decision
attribute by the support of the conditional attributes. In order to measure the accuracy of the proposed
model in the estimation of the environmental, social, and governance performance, we have divided
the number of firms whose ESG group is correctly estimated by the total number of firms. In other
words, this accounts for the percentage of firms accurately predicted by the rough set model.
2.2. Data
The data were compiled from Thomson Reuters, which includes information regarding the global
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) rating score. ESG ranges from 0 (minimum score) to
100 (maximum score). In addition, stock market and financial information from 2013 to 2018 was also
gathered to explain the behavior of ESG scores. According to previous literature, we considered the
following independent variables (see Appendix A for a detailed definition of variables):
• ROA: Return on assets
• EPS: Earnings per share
• Size: Market capitalization (in euros)
• D/E: Debt to equity ratio
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• Beta: Coefficient Beta, which measures the stock’s volatility in relation to the market
• Vol: Trading volume, the amount of securities that were traded during the year
• Sector: Variable that indicates the firm sector
Sector was transformed into binary variables to indicate which sector the firm belongs to (basic
materials, consumer, financial, healthcare, industrial, technology, and others).
The sample includes 1688 observations for the covered period. In order to apply the rough set
theory on the dataset, we grouped the ESG scores into three balanced groups (each group comprises
1/3 of the total sample size). We can observe significant differences regarding dispersion in all
three clusters (Figure 2). The most homogeneous group is the one composed of firms in the central
group. The ESG rating for these firms varies between 58.4 and 72.4. The most heterogeneous group is
the one related to low-ranked firms. In this case, the ESG scores go from 8.3 to 58.4.
The aim of the rough set model proposed in this paper is to design a rule system capable of
predicting the ESG group for each firm, once the values of the independent variables are considered.
Although alternative statistical methodologies could be used in this context, the rough set methodology
provides some advantages according to the literature: (1) The relative simplicity of interpretation [95],
and (2) the use of original variables without requiring any additional requirements or hypotheses,
such as probability distributions in statistics [96]. The latter applies to our research in a direct way.
Another distinctive property of rough sets is the dimensionality reduction performed through the
reduction of the initial table of data. Rough sets eliminate redundant information by means of
reducts. A reduct defines the minimum set of variables that conserve the same capacity for classifying
the original elements of the original table of observations. This way, the reduct constitutes the
most concise way of differentiating among decision classes. Removing redundant information is a
powerful alternative to deal with multicollinearity issues observed in some statistical approaches.
Notwithstanding this, rough sets have been criticized because of some shortcomings: Unfixed structure
and poor universality [97].
If no information was provided to the rough set model, the naive prediction should have a
1/3 chance of guessing the correct ESG group. Hence, a model with a hit ratio of greater than 1/3 is
considered a better alternative to the naive model. Such a model would confirm that the variables
considered in the research are useful in the explanation of the ESG rating of firms.
Figure 2. Distribution of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) scores.
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Table 1 includes the summary statistics for the independent variables. Profits are measured
through ROA and EPS ratios. Negative values represent firms with losses. We can observe a
huge variation regarding debt. Some firms have no debt (D/E = 0), while other firms are seriously
indebted. The highest value of D/E is 104.875, which translates into a company whose debt is nearly
105 times higher than the book value of the firm. The Beta coefficient also presents a wide range of
values, and shows that stock market returns of some companies are uncorrelated with the market
(the minimum value is −0.081). We applied the log transformation on the market capitalization in
order to manage lower values in Table 1. Regarding the sector, the most frequent one is the Consumer
sector, which includes 22.7% of the firms in the dataset.
Table 1. Summary statistics for the variables considered in the research.
Attribute Mean St. Deviation Min Max
ROA 0.041 0.055 −0.401 0.480
Ln(SIZE) 22.59 1.337 15.79 26.18
EPS 5.325 76.125 −128.543 3121.872
D/E 0.439 2.600 0.000 104.875
Beta 0.883 0.350 −0.081 2.438
Vol 27.10 13.22 8.53 213.50
Materials 0.115 0.319 0 1
Consumer 0.227 0.419 0 1
Financial 0.165 0.371 0 1
Healthcare 0.069 0.254 0 1
Industrial 0.195 0.397 0 1
Technology 0.068 0.252 0 1
Others 0.165 0.367 0 1
3. Results
This section describes the different phases that we followed to apply the rough set methodology
to the data introduced in Section 2. The research was carried out by using the software R
(version 3.6.2) [98] and the package RoughSets (version 1.3.7) [99]. The results are presented in detail
and discussed.
The first phase is devoted to generating the input data, i.e., the condition attributes and the
decision attribute, along with the decision table for the rough set analysis. The decision table is
denoted by S = (U, A ∪ {d}), where A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} represents the conditional attributes for each
company, namely the variables ROA, EPS, Size, D/E, Beta, Volume, and Sector. The decision attribute
d is the ESG score given by Thomson Reuters for companies in our dataset.
After performing the generation of the decision table, the second phase consists of discretization
(data pre-processing), generation of reducts and rules, and computation of decision rules.
The discretization process permits the handling of discrete attributes by partitioning continuous
attributes, which is performed through a set of cut points Pj = {Pj1, Pj2, . . . , Pjq}. The extreme points Pj1
and Pjq are the minimum and maximum values of attribute aj, respectively. We used equal-frequency
discretization, so each interval contains the same number of objects. In order to perform a sensitivity
analysis on the results, we considered different values for parameter q: q ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7}. Table 2 shows
an example of attribute partitioning where q = 4. The values correspond to percentiles 0%, 25%, 50%,
and 100%. The discretization process is not applied on binary attributes (sector) because these variables
always have the same extreme points: 0 and 1.
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Table 2. Discretization through attribute partitioning. Values for the q = 4 case.
Attribute Pj1 Pj2 Pj3 Pj4
ROA −0.401 0.022 0.054 0.480
Ln(SIZE) 15.791 22.046 23.134 26.177
EPS −14.885 1.420 3.732 3,121.872
D/E 0.000 0.199 0.426 104.875
Beta −0.081 0.731 0.967 2.438
Vol 8.529 20.866 28.801 213.500
The last phase consists of the computation of all possible reducts. This step is important in
rough set analysis “since the reducts can result in obtaining a set of minimal attributes that discern a
maximum number of objects through the decision table” [90]. In the first phase, the discretization of
data was performed, and this enables the extraction of the core information to generate the reducts.
These reducts are necessary for generating the specific rules. Once the reducts are obtained, the decision
rules are expressed in the IF–THEN form.
We give some examples of rules in Table 3. For example, rule 1 would translate into the
IF–THEN form of Equation (6). This means that the rough set model considers that those firms
with attributes ROA, Size, EPS, and D/E in the lower partition, with Beta and Vol in the second




(ROA ∈ [−0.401, 0.022) & Ln(SIZE) ∈ [15.791, 22.046) & EPS ∈ [−14.885, 1.420)
D/E ∈ [0.000, 0.199) & Beta ∈ [0.731, 0.967) & Vol ∈ [20.866, 28.801) &
Materials = 0 & Consumer = 0 & Financial = 0 & Technology = 0 &
Industrial = 0 & Others = 0)
THEN
ESG group = 2
(6)
Table 3. A subset of the rules extracted for the q = 4 case.
Attribute Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3 Rule 4
ROA [−0.401, 0.022) [−0.401, 0.022) [−0.401, 0.022) [0.022, 0.054)
Ln(SIZE) [15.791, 22.046) [15.791, 22.046) [15.791, 22.046) [15.791, 22.046)
EPS [−14.885, 1.420) [−14.885, 1.420) [−14.885, 1.420) [−14.885, 1.420)
D/E [0.000, 0.199) [0.000, 0.199) [0.000, 0.199) [0.000, 0.199)
Beta [0.731, 0.967) [0.731, 0.967) [0.967, 2.438] [0.967, 2.438]
Vol [20.866, 28.801) [28.801, 213.500] [28.801, 213.500] [28.801, 213.500]
Materials [0,1) [0,1) [0,1) [1,1]
Consumer [0,1) [0,1) [0,1) [0,1)
Financials [0,1) [0,1) [0,1) [0,1)
Industrials [0,1) [0,1) [0,1) [0,1)
Technology [0,1) [0,1) [0,1) [0,1)
Others [0,1) [0,1) [0,1) [0,1)
ESG group 2 2 2 1
The rules given in Table 3 are just a few examples of the rule system extracted by the rough set
methodology. Actually, the system reported 762 rules by combining different values in the attributes
considered for the estimation of the ESG group. The number of potential rules depends on the reducts
extracted during the process, but also depends on the parameter q used in the discretization step.
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We carried out four different experiments for q ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7}. Doing this, we can analyze how results can
change according to the potential number of reducts considered in the process. Eventually, the aim of
this procedure was to confirm whether results were robust regardless of the parametrization considered
by the decision maker. In order to compare the accuracy of the ESG group prediction, we ran the model
500 times for any value of q. We chose 75% of the sample for training and 25% for testing. Figure 3
represents the distribution of the hit ratio for each experiment conducted. The vertical dotted blue line
represents the hit ratio of the naive model. As we have previously mentioned, a naive system would
have a probability of 1/3 (33.3%) of guessing the true ESG group correctly. In all four experiments,
the mean hit ratio of the rough sets is clearly above the naive hit ratio, thus confirming the suitability of
this methodology in the prediction of the ESG rating group regardless of the discretization procedure.
We also analyzed the robustness of the model regarding the number of ESG groups. Figures 4–6
represent the distribution of the hit ratio for four, five, and six equally balanced ESG groups,
respectively. The analysis gives insights about the discriminant power of the independent variables
when firms are clustered in a larger number of groups. As in the previous experiment, we ran each
model 500 times for any value of q (q ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7}). Moving from three to four ESG groups reduces the
average hit ratio from 51.7% to 42.4%. The threshold that discriminates whether the model performs
better than the naive model also drops from 1/3 (33.3%) to 1/4 (25%). As in the case of three ESG
groups, none of the 500 runs for each q value performed worse than the naive model. Hence, we can
conclude that the independent variables considered in our research have explanatory power on the
ESG grouping after splitting the dataset into four equally balanced groups. However, the goodness
of the model ceases when firms are clustered in five (Figure 5) or six (Figure 6) groups. There is no
improvement in the prediction of the ESG group, and we obtain similar results to those reported by a
naive model, where the odds of guessing the correct group by chance are 20% and 16.7%, respectively.
Figure 3. Distribution of the hit ratio; firms are clustered in three ESG groups according to their
ESG scores.
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Figure 4. Distribution of the hit ratio; firms are clustered in four ESG groups according to their
ESG scores.
Figure 5. Distribution of the hit ratio; firms are clustered in five ESG groups according to their
ESG scores.
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Figure 6. Distribution of the hit ratio; firms are clustered in six ESG groups according to their
ESG scores.
The relevance of the explanatory variables was also addressed by performing a regression analysis.
The main difference with the rough set approach is that the regression analysis can handle with the
original ESG score as the dependent variable, instead of clustering the ESG performance into three, four,
five, or six groups. This enables the determination of the statistical significance of each independent
variable, along with the statistical significance of the model as a whole. According to the results
(Table 4), the regression model explains the 26.9% (adjusted R-squared) of the variability in ESG
scores. This value is in line with our previous discussion on how the rough set model tackles the
prediction of the ESG group. The higher the number of groups, the lower the discriminant power
of the model. The regression model can be viewed as an extreme case of the aforementioned rule,
where the maximum number of groups is accomplished: As many groups as observations in the
sample. Despite the limited statistical relevance of the model, the p-values confirm the significant
relationship between ESG scores and a small group of explanatory variables. The model establishes
a positive relationship between the ESG score and the size and beta of the firm. The negative ROA
coefficient suggests that firms facing losses are precisely the most engaged in CSR activities, which
contradicts the slack resources mechanism. Finally, we can observe that the sector has no significant
influence on the ESG score.
Our results show that the economic and financial variables used allow us to correctly predict the
relative CSP of companies. The model works best when companies are assigned to three different
groups according to their CSP, and loses predictive ability as the number of groups increases. It is
interesting to note that the size and ROA variables proved to be significant, as shown in Table 4.
The relationship between a company’s size and its CSP is one of the hypotheses that appears recurrently
in the literature. Thus, larger companies have greater resources to carry out information disclosure
of their socially responsible activities and to respond to requests for information from social rating
agencies, which could explain their better relative ratings. Therefore, this result is in line with previous
research. This is not the case with ROA. In our study, a lower ROA value is related to a better position
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in the CSR ranking. This is an unexpected result and contrasts with the expectations of the slack
resources mechanism and the conclusions of other studies. The difference of the results can be due to
the different CSP measures employed. In our study, we use a single score to account for the CSP of
the firms. On the contrary, the studies mentioned in the research literature use specific CSP measures
regarding different stakeholders and different CSR activities, such as philanthropy.
Table 4. Regression analysis model.
Estimate Std. Error t Value p-Value
(Intercept) −65.649527 6.819537 −9.627 <2× 10−16 ***
ROA −46.243597 6.506146 −7.108 1.74× 10−12 ***
‘LN(SIZE)’ 5.657986 0.285209 19.838 <2× 10−16 ***
EPS 0.004602 0.004368 1.054 0.2922
‘D/EV’ 0.188848 0.128607 1.468 0.1422
BETA 6.346268 1.066307 5.952 3.23× 10−9 ***
VOL −0.060161 0.030450 −1.976 0.0483 *
MAT −0.990511 1.620322 −0.611 0.5411
CONS 0.807097 1.452881 0.556 0.5786
FINANC −1.325852 1.525423 −0.869 0.3849
INDU −1.075244 1.475448 −0.729 0.4663
TECH 0.342110 1.815740 0.188 0.8506
OTHERS −1.845143 1.513648 −1.219 0.2230
Note: Significant codes: ‘***’ 0.001, ‘*’ 0.05; Residual standard error: 13.56 on 1675 degrees of freedom;
Multiple R-squared: 0.2739, Adjusted; R-squared: 0.2687; F-statistic: 52.66 on 12 and 1675 degrees of freedom,
p-value: <2.2× 10−16.
It is also interesting to note that neither the debt ratio nor the business sector play a decisive
role in the classification made by the rough set method. In the case of leverage, this may indicate
that the positive effects of debt on the socially responsible behavior of companies (companies with
high leverage will engage in socially responsible activities to reduce the cost of capital, improve credit
ratings, and attract socially responsible investors, and can have more liquidity to undertake socially
responsible actions) are in balance with the negative effects (more debt means higher interest expenses
and lower profits, which prevent the implementation of expensive socially responsible actions).
The business sector was included in order to account for the insurance and the penance
mechanisms. As the industry sector is often used by investors as a negative screening variable,
it is possible that companies in some industries try to compensate this negative image by means of
socially responsible activities and obtaining high scores from social rating agencies. It is also possible
that companies in sectors that are usually involved in CSR scandals also improve their scores in penance
for past activities and to clean their image, or to be prepared for future scandals. As mentioned in
the literature research, CSP has been proven to be linked with risk mitigation in the case of negative
events and irresponsible activities on an individual basis. In our study, we use a single measure for
CSP and do not account for these events specifically. It is probably the case that negative events occur
in companies across most or all industry sectors and, as a result, the industry sector is not a useful
variable in our methodology.
4. Conclusions
This paper analyzes the relevance of financial information in the prediction of the environmental,
social, and governance performance (ESG) of publicly traded European companies. Our results support
that financial information has predictive power on ESG. A large dataset composed of European public
companies was gathered for the period 2013–2018. Regarding the methodology, we applied the rough
set theory, a powerful mathematical tool that allows the extraction of information from an uncertain,
ambiguous, and imperfect context.
After performing different experiments by modifying the values of the discretization parameter
and the number of ESG groups, the results suggest that the variables considered are useful in the
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prediction of ESG rank when firms are clustered in three or four equally balanced groups. However,
the performance of the model vanishes when a larger number of groups is computed (five and six).
This would suggest that the industry sector and financial variables serve to find big differences across
firms regarding ESG, but the model becomes non-significant when we search for explanations for
small differences in ESG performance scores.
As a future research line, we propose the inclusion of additional financial and non-financial
variables and the consideration of a wider dataset of firms. Omitting these variables can bias the
estimates and the significance of the proposed framework, which is a limitation in our empirical
analysis. Another promising line of research is the consideration of geographical singularities to better
understand how the relationship between variables varies depending on the geographical context.
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Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
ESG Environmental, social, and governance
CFP Corporate financial performance
CSP Corporate social performance
CSR Corporate social responsibility
ROA Return on assets
ROE Return on equity
ROS Return on sales
Appendix A
This section includes the definitions of financial ratios and variables used in the research:
Return on Assets (ROA):
• ROA = Net IncomeTotal Assets
Size of the firm (logarithm - Ln(SIZE)):
• Ln(SIZE) = logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm (in euros)
Earnings per share (EPS):
• EPS = Net IncomeOutstanding Shares
Debt to equity ratio (D/E):
• D/E = Total LiabilitiesShareholders Equity .
Beta:
• Beta = Cov(ri ,rm)Var(rm) , with ri = return of the firm i, with rm = return of the market, Cov(ri, rm =
covariance between the return of the firm i and the return of the market, and Var(rm) the variance
of the returns of the market.
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